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IMPACT OF FEDERAL TAXATION
The second point I would emphasize in connection with the creative aspect
of tax law is that the responses of private law are sometimes in themselves
distortions. They represent legislative decisions on private law matters which
probably would not have been acceptable in the absence of tax considerations.
What is good for taxation is not necessarily otherwise good for the country.
I am somewhat disappointed that time did not permit Sneed to develop
the point that tax law has spawned a sizable amount of friendly state-court
litigation designed to recast transactions or to reform instruments in order to
put the friendly group of litigants in a better federal tax position. Perhaps
only in a strained sense can such judicial activity be considered an alteration
of substantive private law. This sympathetic judicial response, however, has
an important bearing on the operation of our system of private law. It tends to
set a tone that is not easily forgotten. The actual magnitude of such sympathetic
response is very hard to gauge inasmuch as many of the decisions go unrecorded or unnoticed. But there is ample evidence that numerous state courts
have repeatedly been more than lenient, if not virtually compliant, in backstopping poor draftsmanship or bad planning, all at the expense of the federal
revenues. I cannot believe that such performances increase the prestige of the
judiciary or produce a desirable climate for the dispensation of justice.
Finally, I join Sneed in predicting that the processes of what he terms
fiscalizing our private law in response to tax law probably will continue unabated.
In many respects our federal tax system seems to have a dominant characteristic:
it continues to keep moving in the direction it is already going.
ERNEsT

J. BROWN*

I can't enter into whatever area of disagreement there may be between
Mr. Sneed and Mr. Blum on the amount or pace of change the tax law has
brought into private law. It exists, and that is perhaps the most significant
thing. I am interested in exploring elements which may be obvious. But it may
be of some advantage to make them explicit. These are the elements of the
framework of Mr. Sneed's very fruitful inquiry. It is, as so many things are
with us, an exploration into our federalism. Of course, it is nothing new to
have taxes and tax law influence private law and private institutions. The
feudal equivalent of taxation was at least one of the stimuli that ultimately
resulted in the law of trusts. In our own country when the Supreme Court
was unable to discover constitutional restraints of any great rigor on the
rather ambitious reach of state inheritance taxation and state franchise taxation,
the personal holding company emerged as a check on the former and the intricate
proliferation of subsidiary and affiliated business corporations helped to check
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the latter. It is of interest, perhaps ironic interest, that the income tax in turn
made those institutions less useful by making them considerably more
expensive than they had been.
It is also true, as Mr. Sneed pointed out, that the tax law must reflect
the society on which it operates and its institutions, including some, but I
would emphasize not all, of its private law manifestations. But what makes
our problem noteworthy and really quite new as such things go is that it is
only within recent years, as at least some of us can remember, that the taxation
which has the heaviest and most immediate and-this I think is significantthe most highly conditioned, the most intricately conditioned impact on millions
of persons and corporations, is now federal taxation, whereas private law and
legal institutions are for the most part products of state government or in the
custody of state government. Now with two governments operating in the
same field, the problem, of course, is more difficult. If we are concerned with
state taxation and state law there is a possibility to coordinate, to adjust
the balance, if one seems to be overly important with respect to the other.
But the federal system produces a greater difficulty and, of course, it is much
enhanced when we consider that private law is the product not of one state
government but of fifty. I should say "for the most part," and that qualification
will be assumed, because, of course, there is some private federal law. This
seems to me, as it does to Mr. Sneed and perhaps to a lesser extent to Mr.
Blum, to be a new problem and since we have to deal with it, I would like to
explore for a moment how the approach might be organized.
First of all I take it we have to find the framework of the problem. Now
this is fairly simple. The constitution gives Congress the power to tax, and for
some time Congress has been exercising that power and I presume it will continue to do so. Article VI provides that federal law is controlling, and that
includes tax law. The second part of the framework is that so far as I know
there has never been a wholly neutral taxing statute. People react to fiscal
exactions, and when they are conditioned they react the more intricately. I
don't think you can have a fiscally fertile law which is institutionally sterile.
It can be the other way around very easily, but not fiscally fertile and
institutionally sterile. Those are the two major parts of the framework.
Now I don't take it that it is constitutionally amiss that Congress knows
and gives thought to the results, either in law or institutions, that a taxing law
may produce. Some of you may disagree with that, but the fact is it will produce
them, and I find it difficult to think that Congress is forbidden to use its
intelligence in imagining what the results will be. And in anything I say,
I am more concerned with the unintended results rather than the intended. I
may argue with the wisdom of specific Congressional action which does shape
local law, but that wisdom is for argument there, and I don't mean to impugn
the power.
If that is the framework of the problem, we must also decide what
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are the desiderata, what are the objectives. I can name two that seem to me
fairly important. You may not agree with them, but they are, I think, primary,
if you do. One is that federal tax law should be, as far as may be, uniform.
This isn't only because the Constitution suggests that at least some federal taxes
should be uniform, but because it is fair, wise and politic that federal taxation
should be so in its impact. Of course there are economic variations, but one
won't find many apologists for an explicitly checkerboard effect in federal
taxation.
The second desideratum is that the control of private law should, for
the most part, remain with the states. I am no herald of revolution, and I
assume that most of us think that it is, and should be for the states, considering
the variety and size of this country, in large areas to make their own decisions
for creativity, caution, differentiation and experimentation. This does not suggest
that every state's boundary is exactly ordained from on high, but they are
there and the country varies richly. We may want in many cases a greater
uniformity of private law. I am not against the Uniform Sales Act, either
new or old version, but I think most of us will assume that for the time it is
wise that the states should have a large degree of power in making these
decisions.
Now I don't think I am arguing for contradictory things, as it might
appear, because I am both for uniformity and for variety. If I were, they could
be adjusted and the problem of adjustment would, of course, be for someone,
probably Congress. But I think I am arguing for a uniform tax law which
permits variety in the states, and so I don't think that there is any inconsistency.
Now if my statement of the framework is correct, the responsibility,
I think, lies where responsibility usually lies, that is, where the power lies,
and that is with the federal government, if we are to achieve these objectives which
I at least assume we desire. I say federal government advisedly because that
includes Congress, the courts, including the Tax Court, of course, and the
administrators, and if Mr. Lubick isn't displeased, I will include the people who
propose statutes among the administrators. At least they can't enact them.
But on all three levels it seems to me that there is responsibility. Now that
responsibility is not easily assumed, and I am not saying that every failure is
shameful. Take those things we all admire: thought, wisdom, and restraint.
Sir Isaiah Berlin remarked a few years ago that there seemed to be a worldwide shortage in sages, and so not all difficulties will be overcome.
But let's turn to a few specifics that have been mentioned before. When
the institutions of private law vary fundamentally, of course, adjustment of the
tax law to be uniform in its impact is the more difficult. The obvious, the
conventional example, will be the difference between the community property
states and the common law states which existed for years. Both my predecessors
have mentioned that. Now as we all know there was a divergence which was
very significant, and as the rates in the graduation grew higher, the divergence
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grew more significant. Now where the responsibility for that lay originally,
I don't know. It wasn't explicit in the statute, but it was in the statute as
the Supreme Court read it in Poe v. Seaborn. Some of my colleagues would tell
you where I would put the responsibility if I conceived the result to be wrong.
We needn't explore that today; but whether it was Congress or the Court, after
the Court did it, it was certainly up to Congress to rectify the error either of
its own or the Supreme Court's making. It was unsupportable that the country
should be divided in this fashion. Now I think that Pennsylvania, Nebraska and
such other states as there were-and, as I recall, New York did a little exercise
in brinksmanship, too, and came close to the border-I think they were rash
in abandoning the centuries old heritage of common law property. Nevertheless,
the responsibility lay with Congress, and unless Congress was trying to induce
the adoption of community property law all over the country, as I can't believe
it was, then it had to do something about it. It did do something about it fairly
well and fairly effectively in 1948. It took a long time, but it did it.
With that
having become a quite fundamental policy, then it seems to me it is incumbent on the administrators and the judges not to reverse it by nibbling
away. And I use considerable restraint when I say that I think, for instance,
the Supreme Court was unwise in its quite casual decision in the Davis
case last spring which broadens the gap between the community property
and the common law states in the matter of the tax aspect of divorce settlements. I happen to know, because I read the government's brief, that the
brief is very restrained. The court went much further in giving the government
a victory that it didn't press for, than the request had been. The casual
manner with which the court said: "It's true it creates a difference between
common law and community property states," the casual nature with which
the court did that, seems to me, shall I say, unfortunate. The same decision
also magnified the tax aspect of divorce settlements, a difficult matter at best.
And again this was neither necessary nor in my estimation required.
Congress has made some mistakes. Professor Sneed mentions the marital
deduction and the allowance for dependents. Now here I think the responsibility
lies solely with Congress. I think it is clear that the crux of the purpose of
the marital deduction and the limitations on it are fairly simple. The draftsmen
and the Congress, which adopted their work, came up with an over-elaborate
device which may or may not have been someone's idea of a way to achieve
a fairly simple result, but experience has shown it to be a very unfortunate
and a very intricate and complicated device in which many difficulties have
grown up, most of them nonfunctional, most of them unrelated to the purpose
of the limitations on the marital deduction. This seems to me to have been
over-expertness become inexpertness. I also question whether Congress was
wise in its dealing with the stock option provision. On somewhat larger grounds,
it has done something which has induced a number of states to amend their
statutes, to take advantage of this rather questionable legislative bounty.
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The Hardenbergh Case which Mr. Sneed has mentioned is a case differentiating between renunciation of legacies and renunciation of an intestate's
succession. It is a case in which it seems to me that a court, the Tax Court
originally, fell into a trap, into a difficulty which a sense of judicial responsibility
should have avoided. It was faced, perhaps as I read between the lines of its
opinion, with a decision of a Court of Appeals with which it disagreed, in the
case of Brown v. Routzahn. Instead of facing that disagreement, it turned
to this quite specious difference between vesting subject to divesting and not
vesting at all. Now indeed it is almost inconceivable that any rational person
could have felt that this had any function to perform with respect to the
federal gift tax statute, whether the legatee or heir should or should not pay a
gift tax. But the Tax Court adopted it; it was affirmed by a different Court
of Appeals, and the tax differences are now such as to move the states to eliminate
at best a meaningless differentiation. Whether this should move the states or
whether it just differentiates the states seems to me not particularly significant.
'All I am saying is that with the difference turning on perhaps a bit of
terminology, and not much more than that in state law, it is certainly something
that a conscientious court might have turned away from.
When I say courts I should broaden the responsibility, because it is the
responsibility of lawyers as well. I take it that it is the first responsibility
of the lawyers in the Treasury and Department of Justice to administer the
tax law wisely. Their responsibility for winning cases lies within the ambit
of that first responsibility. They present such points to the federal courts, and
in doing so they certainly seem to me to be departing from that wise overall
policy of reconciling uniformity and diversity. I think both of these can be
achieved. We may ultimately want to do away with the diversity. But while
we have it, tax uniformity with diversity of law can be achieved. They do
take restraint and some measure of thought. But I for one don't think that
the achievement is likely to be inconsistent with the call to greatness which
Professor Sneed has mentioned.
DONALD C. LuBIcx*
Dean Hyman, the accident of alphabet makes it rather difficult for me
to add anything to the comments which we have been fortunate to receive from
three of the best and leading scholars in the tax legal field in the country.
However, I perhaps can bring you a message that is even better, since
yesterday my boss, the Secretary of the Treasury, emphasized that next year
we will have both lower taxes and greatness, and the sooner we have them,
the sooner I can get back to Buffalo. We have heard a good deal today about
the distortions of state law by federal tax rules. You may not know that
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